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a b s t r a c t
This study provides new evidence about the effects of subsidies for research and development (R&D)
on technical efﬁciency in a sample of Spanish manufacturers during the period 1993-2002. The results
suggest two issues to consider. Firstly, the beneﬁciary ﬁrms of subsidies are less efﬁcient; to avoid this
effect, this result should serve to as a guide to authorities,with the aimof improving the allocationof these
resources. Secondly, less efﬁcient ﬁrms are those that are unable to obtain resources to fundR&Dor obtain
credit and are therefore those that apply for subsidies. In light of these results, the subsidies received by
Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms may be insufﬁcient or may fail to arrive when required, hampering the
fulﬁlment of their objectives.
© 2010 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
Inﬂuencia de las subvenciones a la investigación en la eﬁciencia técnica: el caso
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r e s u m e n
Este trabajo aportanuevas evidencias sobre los efectosque las subvenciones a la investigaciónydesarrollo
(I +D) tienen en la eﬁciencia técnica, para una muestra de empresas espan˜olas en el período 1993-2002.
Los resultados obtenidos sugieren dos cuestiones a tener en cuenta. En primer lugar, las empresas be-
neﬁciarias de las subvenciones son menos eﬁcientes; este resultado debería servir como orientación a losalabras clave:
ubvenciones
nvestigación y desarrollo
ﬁciencia
rogreso técnico no neutral
organismos que conceden estas ayudas para tratar de mejorar la asignación de estos recursos al objeto
de evitar este efecto y mejorar. En segundo lugar, las empresas menos eﬁcientes son las que no tienen
capacidad de obtener recursos propios para ﬁnanciar la I +D u obtener un crédito, de modo que son las
que solicitan las subvenciones. Teniendo en cuenta estos resultados es probable que las subvenciones
recibidas por las empresas manufactureras espan˜olas sean insuﬁcientes o no lleguen en el momento
oportuno, lo cual impide que cumplan con sus objetivos.
010© 2
. Introduction
The development of new products is an essential part of many
rms’ strategies, and as Feldman and Kelley (2003) andHuang et al.
2008) signal, in some cases certain private ﬁrms may not pursue
echnology researchanddevelopment (R&D)projectsbecause,ﬁrst,
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: justo.dejorge@uah.es (J. de Jorge), cristina.suarez@uah.es
C. Suárez).
138-5758/$ – see front matter © 2010 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All righ
oi:10.1016/j.cede.2010.11.001ACEDE. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos reservados.
R&D scientiﬁc and technical frontiers are risky and the chances
of failure are high; second, an individual ﬁrm may not have the
capabilities required to develop the technology; and, third, pri-
vate incentives may not be sufﬁcient to induce a ﬁrm to undertake
the project in the face of difﬁculties in appropriating the resulting
beneﬁts.
Firms’ incentives to conduct R&Dmay, however, be smaller than
the socially optimal incentives. A public subsidy for R&D may then
be an effective tool for bringing private incentives to conduct R& D
in line with social incentives. The role of government intervention
in economic and industrial development has been a constant topic
ts reserved.
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f discussion and concern in the literature and in different social
renas. As Heijs (2003) mentions, since industrialisation began,
on-interventionism, or laissez faire, has received broad support
Smith, 1776). On the other hand, an active role for the public insti-
utions can ensure a fast process of industrialisation. Economic
rguments justifying public intervention and related to the neo-
lassical perspective focus largely on market failures, linked to the
ublicnatureof the result of theR&D, thepresenceof spillovers, and
hecostsor risks inherent to the innovationprocess that arepresup-
osed by a suboptimal level of investment among ﬁrms in market
conomies. This line includes modern growth theories (Romer,
986; Romer, 1990; Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991),
s well as the evolutionary perspective (Nelson and Winter, 1982;
all, 1994; Freeman, 1994; among others). As indicated in Marra
2006), although an abundant empirical literature has analysed the
ffectiveness of public policies on ﬁrms’ innovative activity, the
esults have been inconclusive. Surveys of the empirical literature
hat analyze the impact of public aids to the ﬁrms’ R&D investment
re the papers of David et al. (2000), Klette et al. (2000) and Toole
nd Turvey (2009) and with a special attention to the Spanish case
s the paper of Busom (2000), Blanes and Busom (2004), González
t al. (2005), Pereiras and Huergo (2006).
While there is an extensive body of empirical research on the
ffects that R&D subsidies have on a ﬁrm’s R&D effort, growth
r patenting activity, there is limited evidence, to the best of our
nowledge, on the subsidy allocation process and its implications
or efﬁciency. The current work contributes to this empirical liter-
ture, analysing whether public support for private research and
nnovations activities1 affect ﬁrms’ technical efﬁciency in a sample
f innovative Spanish manufacturers during the period 1993-2002.
or this purpose, we want to explain ﬁrm differences in efﬁciency,
ollowing the methodology proposed by Lieberman and Dhawan
2005), which try to connect the resource-based view of the ﬁrm
RBV) and the frontier analysis, speciﬁcally, we apply Battese and
oelli’s model (1995). This frontier model not only allows us to
stimate the ﬁrm’s technical inefﬁciency but, simultaneously, to
dentify the variables that are statistically related to inefﬁciency,
hat is, the determinants of the inefﬁciency reached and, in our
aper, the R&D subsidies received by the ﬁrms. Such applications
n the Spanish case has been made linking efﬁciency and export
Delgado et al., 2002), efﬁciency and labour force competition (Díaz
nd Sánchez, 2004), efﬁciency and organisational factors (Díaz and
ánchez, 2008).
The work is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a frame-
ork of the effects of subsidies for R&D on ﬁrms’ efﬁciency.
ection 3 presents a descriptive analysis of the data, as well as
he variables used in the research. In Section 4, we explain the
ethodology. The ﬁfth section reports the results of the production
unction and an analysis of the sectoral efﬁciency using kernel dis-
ributions, stressing the comparative analysis of theﬁrms’ technical
fﬁciency with respect to their receipt or otherwise of subsidies.
inally, Section 6 presents the ﬁnal conclusions of the work and
ossible future extensions.
. Effects of subsidies for R&D on ﬁrms’ efﬁciency
ramework
Government subsidies for R&D have been offered for several
ecades in most industrialized countries, either in the form of indi-
ect support such as tax incentives or by direct interventions for
peciﬁc initiatives. The government rationalizes that such support
ill result in competitive beneﬁts for the ﬁrm, which will spill over
1 See Cotec (2000) for a survey of the relations between ﬁrms which do innova-
ions and the Administrations in Spain.irección de la Empresa 14 (2011) 185–193
into the economy and ultimately increase industry competitive-
ness, and formulates several evaluation approaches to assess the
performances of the R&D support (Luukkonen, 1998).
Numerous studies justify government intervention in techno-
logical innovation in response tounderinvestmentofR&D inprivate
ﬁrms for market incentives (Sanz-Menéndez, 1995; Heijs, 2003).
This fact is historically linked to the conceptual framework of
market failure, meaning that the government has an interest in
stimulating private R&D because such stimulation can generate
social beneﬁts ultimately that go beyond the simple underinvest-
ment hypothesis (Luukkonen, 1998). R&D subsidies are included
within the external factors that inﬂuence innovation. These fac-
tors in turn are framed within the legal and regulatory framework,
implemented by public authorities, directly or indirectly governing
these activities. In this sense, subsidies, like the rest of factorswhich
include the use of industrial property, stafﬁng, research centers
and universities and tax may not have received the same atten-
tion in the literature compared with internal factors which may
arise for the effects of changing a ﬁrm’s strategy, encouraging it to
enter a new market, to engage in more collaboration, or to improve
their management (Luukkonen, 2000; Georghiou et al., 2004; Hsu
et al., 2009). The arguments of the authors who have analyzed the
inﬂuence of subsidies for R&D have been based in the allocation
of ﬁnancial resources, and the results are not conclusive. While
authors such as Busom (1991) and Fernández et al. (1995) found
a positive relationship between subsidies and innovation, Griliches
(1986) and Lichtenberg (1987) found a negative relationship.
In order to improve the evaluation of public R&D support pro-
grammes, the OECD Working Party on Innovation and Technology
Policy launched a project to measure the so-called behavioural
additionality effects including 12 evaluation reports in 2006 (OECD,
2006). In this paper the output additionality is deﬁned as the
ﬁrms’ technical efﬁciency2, following the methodology proposed
by Lieberman and Dhawan (2005), which try to connect the
resource-based view of the ﬁrm (RBV) and the frontier analysis.
The RBV regards the ﬁrm as a heterogeneous bundle of resources
plus organizational capabilities that may enable the ﬁrm to deploy
resources more efﬁciently than rivals (e.g., Barney, 1986; Rumelt,
1987; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993). The perspective
of the RBV resemble the logic of the frontier production func-
tion model because, as Amit and Schoemaker (1993) deﬁne, the
resources are stocks of available factors that are owned or con-
trolled by the ﬁrm and capabilities refer to a ﬁrm’s capacity to
deploy resources, in our case the subsidies received by those ﬁrms
carrying out R&D activities.
3. Data and descriptive analysis
The data used in this work come from the Survey on Business
Strategies (ESEE), built by the SEPI Foundation (Fundación SEPI)
during the period 1993-2002. The ESEE has been built combining
criteria of exhaustiveness and random sampling in order to main-
tain the representativeness of the industrial ﬁrms of between 10
and 200 employees, by size interval and sector of activity. With
regard to the ﬁrms with over 200 employees, there is a higher level
of representativeness3. The sample consisted of an unbalanced
sample of 5,349 observations, with which we estimated the econo-
metric model described in the following section and we included
both subsidised and non-subsidised ﬁrms.Figure 1 shows the distribution of the ﬁrms engaged in R&D
activities and of the ﬁrms receiving public R&D subsidies, classi-
ﬁed by size into two subsamples: small and medium ﬁrms (SMEs)
2 Other measures of output additionality can be found in Georghiou et al. (2004).
3 A description of this database can be seen in Farin˜as and Jaumandreu (1999).
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Source: Own elaboration, from ESEE data. 
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Figure 1. Distribution by size of ﬁrms investing in R&D and of ﬁrms receiving public R&D subsidies (as % of total) 1993-2002.
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mit = zitı (2)Source: Own elaboration, from ESEE data. 
Figure 2. Means of re
≤200 workers) and large ﬁrms (>200 workers) in the period 1993-
002.
As can be seen, there are important differences in the proportion
f ﬁrms engaged in R&D activities during this period in function of
he size. On average, the ﬁndings conﬁrm that the large ﬁrms (>200
orkers) have a greater proportion of innovative ﬁrms, while the
maller ﬁrms (≤200 workers) have far fewer, in no case exceeding
9%. This result suggests that R&D activities are carried out mainly
y ﬁrms with a large size. On the other hand, certain variability is
vident in the proportion of ﬁrms engaged in R&D activities in each
ize group over time. With regard to the proportion of ﬁrms receiv-
ng public subsidies, only a small percentage of ﬁrms under 200
orkers receive assistance in this period. The proportion is higher
n the ﬁrms over 200 workers, reaching around 25%. There is con-
equently a positive relation between ﬁrm size and proportion of
rms receiving public ﬁnancing. This type of ﬁnancing comes from
hree different sources: the regional administration, the central
overnment and European funds.
Figure 2 summarises the relevant variables of this work – inno-
ation effort, measured by R&D spending as a proportion of output;
nd subsidies as a proportion of private R&D spending – differenti-
ting between subsidised ﬁrms and all innovative ﬁrms, during the
eriod 1993-2002.
As can be seen, for the manufacturing ﬁrms analysed the R&D
ffort of the ﬁrms receiving subsidies always exceeds that of inno-
ative ﬁrms as awhole, which suggests that receiving subsidies has
positive effect on private R&D effort. With regard to the average
ubsidy received as a proportion of spending, subsidies represent
round 9.05% of total R&D spending for all innovative ﬁrms and
2.01% for the ﬁrms receiving public ﬁnancing. Thus, subsidies
learly represent an important part of R&D spending in innovative
rms, so in principle they cannot be regarded as a marginal source
f ﬁnancing for ﬁrms’ R&D.variables 1993-2002.
4. Methodology and model speciﬁcation
In this paper, we use the stochastic frontier production func-
tion, speciﬁcally, a panel data version of Battese and Coelli (1995),
in which the technical inefﬁciency is estimated from the stochas-
tic frontier and simultaneously explained by a set of variables.
This approach avoids the inconsistency problems of the two-stage
approach used in other empirical works when analysing the inefﬁ-
ciency determinants4.
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model can be expressed as:
Yit = f (Xit;ˇ) exp (Vit − Uit), i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T, (1)
where Yit denotes (the logarithm of) the production of the i-th
ﬁrm in the t-th time period; Xk represents the k-th logs of the
input quantities; ˇk stands for the output elasticity with respect
to the k-th input; the Vit are random variables which are assumed
to be independent and identically distributed N(0,V2), and dis-
tributed independently of the Uit which are non-negative random
variables which are assumed to account for technical inefﬁciency
in production and are assumed to be independently distributed as
truncations at zero of the N(mit,U2) distribution. The mean of this4 In a two-stageprocedure, ﬁrstly, a stochastic frontier production function is esti-
mated and the inefﬁciency is obtained under the assumption of independently and
identically distributed inefﬁciency effects. But in the second step inefﬁciency effects
are assumed to be a function of some variables, which contradicts the assumption
of identically distributed inefﬁciency effects.
1 ía y Dirección de la Empresa 14 (2011) 185–193
w
e
e
m
t
r
t
(
t
T
o
n
o
c
f
L
w
b
U
w
a
v
l
i
e
t
c
i
n
H
t
a
t
w
p
i
t
–
U
s
i
i
m
s
v
t
b
b
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of variables of production frontier model, 1993-2002.
Variable No. obs. Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Lnsales 5461 10.1503 1.6536 4.8548 15.6072
Lncapital 5461 8.3446 1.9146 0.7662 14.0385
Lnspending 5429 9.4280 1.7831 2.3116 15.4279
Lnemployment 5452 5.0827 1.4326 0 9.5369
LnRDspending 5360 5.3608 2.0361 −3.3233 12.539688 J. de Jorge, C. Suárez / Cuadernos de Econom
here zit is a p×1 vector of variables which may inﬂuence the
fﬁciency of a ﬁrm; and ı is an 1×p vector of parameters to be
stimated.
The production function coefﬁcients (ˇ) and the inefﬁciency
odel parameters (ı) are estimated by maximum likelihood
ogether with the parameterisation from Battese and Corra (1977),
eplacing V2 and U2 with 2=V2 +U2 and =U2/(V2+U2).
Given that technical efﬁciency is the ratio of observed produc-
ion over the maximum technical output obtainable for a ﬁrm
when there is no inefﬁciency), the efﬁciency (TE) of ﬁrm i in year
could be written as:
E = f (Xit;ˇ) exp(Vit − Uit)
f (Xit;ˇ) exp(Vit)
= exp(−Uit) (3)
The efﬁciency scores obtained from expression (3) have a value
f one when the ﬁrm is efﬁcient and less than one otherwise.
This work assumes the Cobb-Douglas production function, with
on-neutral technological progress5. In this way it is possible to
bserve the frontier shifting after controlling for the other factors
onsidered. In particular, the function to estimate has the following
orm:
n(sales) = ˇo + ˇ1LnCit + ˇ2Ln Eit + ˇ3LnKit + ˇ4LnGit−1 + ˇ5 t
+
20∑
i=2
ˇ6iseci + ˇ7LnCit ∗ t + ˇ8 Ln Eit ∗ t + ˇ9 LnKit ∗ t
+ˇ10LnGit−1 ∗ t + Vit − Uit (4)
here the technical inefﬁciency effects are assumed to be deﬁned
y:
it = ı0 + ı1S + ı2S2 + ı3 t + Wit (5)
here, considering the variables in logarithms, K is the capital vari-
ble, E is employment, C the intermediate spending, and G the
ariable that measures spending in R&D. This variable has been
agged oneproductive period,which is shorter than the periodused
n studies for more technologically-developed countries. This gen-
rally ranges from 1.7 to 2.6 years, depending on the sector and
ypeof activity (Rodríguez, 1989)6. Secdenotes a vector of dummies
apturing the sectorial effect. Finally, this stochastic frontier model
ncludes year of observation (t) in such away that non-neutral tech-
ical change is speciﬁed (see, for example, Battese andBroca, 1997).
owever, neutral technical change is present if the coefﬁcients of
he interactions between year of observation and the input vari-
bles are zero. With regard to the inefﬁciency term, S represents
he subsidies received by those ﬁrms carrying out R&D activities,
hile S2 is the quadratic component of the subsidy and t the tem-
oral trend. The coefﬁcient t in equation (5)measures the change in
nefﬁciency over time7. Consequently, if ı3 is negative, “catch-up”
echnical change (movement towards the frontier) is observed, and
ı3 can be indicated as the coefﬁcient of technological change in
it.
In particular, tomeasure theoutput, theproductionof goods and
ervices, we consider the sum of the sales and the variation in sales
nventory for each of the ﬁrms analysed. The input variables are the
ntermediate spending carried out in the production process. Inter-
ediate spending is deﬁned as the sum of purchases and external
ervices, plus the variation in purchase inventory. These variables
5 The Cobb-Douglas production function was chosen because of its simplicity and
alidity in different works (Zellner et al., 1966). Nevertheless, we also tried to use
he trans-log function, but the likelihood function had problems of convergence.
6 Nevertheless, we estimated different models lagging the variable R&D spending
y more than one year. The results barely changed.
7 We try to introduce a non-neutral measure of change in inefﬁciency over time
ut it has not signiﬁcant impact on the inefﬁciency model.Subsidies 5360 445.64 1585.6 0.0420 28313.6
Source: Own elaboration, from ESEE data.
are converted into constant euros using deﬂators from the Spanish
National Statistics Institute (INE). The variable capital for the period
1993-2002 is represented by the capital stock, which is approxi-
mated using the value of net capital at replacement cost less the
corresponding accrued depreciation8. Spending on research and
development is the sumof the internal and external spending, with
this latter ﬁgure a consequence of any sub-contracting carried out
by the ﬁrm. Table 1 shows the sample descriptive statistics of the
variables used to estimate the model of R&D investment during the
period 1993-2002.
5. Estimation of model and results
5.1. Estimation of production frontier
Table2 shows the results of themodel estimated simultaneously
according to maximum likelihood (equations (4) and (5)). The data
used, as mentioned above, are an unbalanced panel in the period
1993-2002 from the ESEE survey on business strategies.
As was mentioned in the previous section, the results shown
in Table 2 assume a Cobb-Douglas stochastic production function,
which has found ample acceptance in the literature9. The chi-
square is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (228 = 261910.85).
The elasticity of mean output with respect to the k-th input
variable, for example employment, in equation (4) has two com-
ponents: ˇ2 +ˇ8*t. The ﬁrst component is the traditional elasticity
of the outputwith respect to the input, this is referred to as the elas-
ticity of frontier output, and the second component of the elasticity
is the non-neutral factor which is referred to as the elasticity of the
technical efﬁcient (this component is zero for neutral stochastic
frontier models). The elasticities are estimated in Table 3. The elas-
ticities of mean output are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level and the elasticities of technical efﬁciency are only
substantial components of the elasticities of the mean output for
employment andR&Dspending, this last inputwith a negative sign.
The non-neutral technical change across all inputs is an adequate
hypothesis for this model because the hypothesis of neutral tech-
nical change: H0: ˇ7 = ˇ8 = ˇ9 = ˇ10 =0 is 2(4) = 24.82 is rejected
and, also, H0: ˇ5 =ˇ7 = ˇ8 = ˇ9 = ˇ10 =0 is 2(5) = 29.01 is rejected.
On the other hand, we reject the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale (2(1) =29.43).
One of the most important stylised facts refers to the results
obtained in the part of the error term where the explanatory
variable of inefﬁciency, i.e., the R&D subsidies received, shows
a curvilinear behaviour (in the form of an inverted U), since its
coefﬁcients 1 and 2 are positive and negative, respectively, and
statistically signiﬁcant at the1%and5% levels. This ﬁnding is impor-
8 The formula of permanent inventory is KNRt= It+KNRt-1(1-t) Pt/Pt-1, where KNR
is the net capital at replacement cost, It the investment in capital assets, t the
depreciation rate of the capital assets, and Pt the price indexes for capital assets
published by the National Statistics Institute (INE).
9 Using ESEE data, authors such as Gumbau (1998) and Martín and Suarez (2000)
use this same speciﬁcation.
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Table 2
Results of estimation.
Estimated Coefﬁcient Std. Error
Production frontier
0 2.203*** 0.056
1 (Capital) 0.121*** 0.009
2 (Purchases) 0.613*** 0.009
3 (Employment) 0.208*** 0.012
4 (R&D spending) 0.029*** 0.006
5 (trend) −0.002 0.006
6 2 (Food and tobacco products) 0.007 0.026
6 3 (Beverages) 0.151*** 0.033
6 4 (Textiles and clothing) −0.172*** 0.026
6 5 (Leather and footwear) −0.206*** 0.032
6 6 (Wood industry) −0.212*** 0.040
6 7 (Paper industry) −0.135*** 0.031
6 8 (Publishing and graphic arts) −0.045 0.036
6 9 (Chemical products) 0.036 0.025
6 10 (Rubber and plastic products) −0.122*** 0.027
6 11 (Non-metallic mineral products) 0.093*** 0.027
6 12 (Ferrous and non-ferrous metals) −0.027 0.027
6 13 (Metal products) −0.066 0.026
6 14 (Agricultural and industrial machines) −0.148*** 0.025
6 15 (Ofﬁce machinery) −0.051* 0.031
6 16 (Electrical machinery and material) −0.093*** 0.025
6 17 (Motor vehicles) −0.138*** 0.026
6 18 (Other transport material) −0.161*** 0.030
6 19 (Furniture industry) −0.084*** 0.030
6 20 (Other manufacturing industries) −0.042 0.034
7 (trend*Capital) 1.3E-04 0.001
8 (trend*Purchases) −0.002 0.001
9 (trend*Employment) 0.006*** 0.002
10 (trend*R&D spending) −0.001** 0.001
Equation uit
uo −5.674*** 1.292
1 (Subsidy) 0.004*** 0.001
2 (Subsidy)2 −8.9E-07** 4.0E-07
3 (trend) −0.333** 0.150
Equation vit
vo −2.968*** 0.020
v 0.227*** 0.002
Log-likelihood 329.61
ˇ
t
t
a
i
t
d
w
t
i
e
i
T
E
N
a
b
bNo. observations 5329
6 1 = sector omitted: Meat industry; Signiﬁcance levels = ***1%, **5%, *10%.
ant for economic policy in Spain, since it allows us to determine
he effect of subsidies on the management of resources in ﬁrms,
nd to what extent these incentives are useful. The result obtained
ndicates a priori that the size of the subsidies relates positively
o inefﬁciency up to a maximum point, from where inefﬁciency
eclines as the subsidy grows further. In otherwords, the subsidies,
hich are meant to support innovation among Spanish manufac-
urers, may not be beneﬁting some of the ﬁrms.
Wenow lookmore closely at the distribution of theﬁrms receiv-
ng subsidies and its relation with the technical inefﬁciency, by
xamining the curvilinear model from the coefﬁcients estimated
n the model. The function is as follows:
Uit = ı0 + ı1S + ı2S2 + ı3 t + Wit;
able 3
lasticities of mean output with respect to inputs.
Elasticity with
respect to:
Elasticity of
frontier output
Elasticity of the
technical
efﬁciciency
Elasticity of
mean output
Capital 0.121** (0.009) 1.3E-04 (0.001) 0.121** (0.008)
Purchases 0.613** (0.009) −0.002 (0.001) 0.612** (0.008)
Employment 0.208** (0.012) 0.006** (0.002) 0.214** (0.010)
R&D spending 0.029** (0.006) −0.001* (0.001) 0.028** (0.005)
ote: In brackets the standard error. Signiﬁcance levels = **1%, *5%.
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Uˆit = −5.674 + 0.004 · S − 8.9 · E − 07 · S2 − 0.333 t (6)
Figure 3 illustrates the relation between inefﬁciency and sub-
sidies. As can be seen, although the relation is curvilinear – the
inefﬁciency dropping as the level of subsidies rises – the mean
subsidy is at approximately 445,000 euros, which corresponds to
almost 80% of the ﬁrms under analysis. Only 2.4% of the observa-
tions are located in the downward part of the inefﬁciency curve.
This shows that the importantpartof the inefﬁciencycurve iswhere
the slope is rising. Subsidies do not incentives the sample ﬁrms
under analysis to improve their efﬁciency.
5.2. Analysis by sector
In this section we analyse the intra-sectoral efﬁciency for the
20 sectors of activity in Spanish manufacturing industry. Figure 4
shows the mean efﬁciency results obtained for each of the CNAE
classiﬁcation sectors the ESEE survey uses to divide the ﬁrms for
every year in the period 1993-2002. The average efﬁciency of the
Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms carrying out research and develop-
ment activities ranges from 0.96 to 0.99%. This means that on
average the ﬁrms are producing around 96-99% of what they could
produce given the quantity of resources used. In other words, the
ﬁrms could raise their production by 4% in the worst case if they
were fully efﬁcient10.
Analysing the mean efﬁciency by sector, some observations
stand out:
) No signiﬁcant differences in mean efﬁciency levels are appreci-
ated between the sectors, since differences do not exceed 3 or
4%.
) Despite the similar average sectoral efﬁciencies, there are intra-
sectoral inequalities in the evolution of the mean efﬁciency
over time. For example, the mean efﬁciency of the sector
ofﬁce machinery shows considerable swings, rising and falling
abruptly over time.
c) In general terms the mean efﬁciency of the sectors tends to con-
verge on high efﬁciency levels.
5.3. Efﬁciency in function of subsidy behaviour: kernel
distributions
In order to observe the relation betweenﬁrmefﬁciency and sub-
sidies received or not received, we built a classiﬁcation variable as
follows (Man˜ez et al., 2005)11:
a) Continually subsidised ﬁrms: ﬁrms receiving subsidies every
year in the period under analysis. Such ﬁrms represent 6.57%
of the sample ﬁrms.
) Incoming ﬁrms: ﬁrms that do not receive a subsidy at ﬁrst, begin
to receive one at some point, and continue to do so until the end
of the period. These ﬁrms represent 7.96% of the sample ﬁrms.
c) Outgoing ﬁrms: ﬁrms that receive a subsidy at ﬁrst, stop doing
so at some point, and remain unsubsidised until the end of the
period. They represent 6.92% of the sample ﬁrms.
) Alternating ﬁrms: ﬁrms that change status at least twice in the
periodunder analysis, i.e., they start to receive a subsidy and stop
10 In Gumbau’s (1998) comparative study for the period 1991-1994, these values
are lower, ranging from 76% to 83%. In the current study, the model follows Battese
and Coelli’s (1995) approach, the time period ismuch longer and the sample of ﬁrms
is different, since the ﬁrms carry out innovation and development.
11 These authors use the same criterion applied to ﬁrms carrying out R&D, the idea
being to avoid sample selection bias.
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Table 4
Firms’ subsidy behaviour.
Trend Obser. % Years
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Con. subs. 350 6.57 33 36 37 30 34 34 33 45 35 33
Incoming 424 7.96 37 44 44 37 41 38 42 53 43 45
Outgoing 369 6.92 41 39 35 34 39 42 43 41 30 25
Alternating 1712 32.13 136 160 162 178 186 195 201 191 154 149
Non-subs. 2474 46.43 227 257 238 236 270 294 285 263 204 200
5329 100% 474 536 516 515 570 603 604 593 466 452
Source: Own elaboration, from ESEE data.
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igure 5. Distribution of mean efﬁciency values with respect to subsidy behaviour.
receiving a subsidy at some point in the period. They represent
32.13% of the sample ﬁrms.
) Non-subsidised ﬁrms: ﬁrms not receiving any type of subsidy at
any time in the period of analysis. They represent 46.43% of the
sample ﬁrms.
Table 4 shows the years for which the ﬁrms’ subsidy behaviour
s observed, using the classiﬁcation variable mentioned above.
The great majority of the ﬁrms analysed are found in the two
ategories non-subsidised and alternating ﬁrms, with 46.43% and
2.13%, respectively, while the other groups have far fewer mem-
ers: continually subsidised ﬁrms (6.57%), incoming ﬁrms (7.96%)
nd outgoing ﬁrms (6.92%).
Figure5 shows theevolutionof themeanefﬁciencyvaluesdivid-
ng the sample according to this classiﬁcation with respect to the
ubsidies received or otherwise. As can be seen, the non-subsidised
rms differ notably12 in their mean values from the other types
f ﬁrm throughout the whole period of analysis, particularly com-
ared to the continually subsidised (or stable) ﬁrms.
The incoming, outgoing and alternating ﬁrms behave dynami-
ally throughout the period, although the outgoing ﬁrms tend to
onverge with the non-subsidised ﬁrms. The analysis carried out
p to now has proved very instructive about the relation of inter-
st here between efﬁciency and R&D subsidies, but the weight of
he analysis refers to just one moment in the distribution, namely
ts mean value. For this reason, we also need to analyse the efﬁ-
iency distribution by means of density functions, carrying out a
on-parametric approximation by using the kernel method, and in
articular estimating a Gaussian kernel with optimal bandwidth13.
his type of approach does not impose, a priori, any functional form
n the distribution. As is commonly said, non-parametric estima-
ion “lets the data speak for themselves”. The purpose of density
stimations is todeterminewhether convergenceordivergencehas
ccurred in the period of analysis. The former would be evident if
he probabilisticmass tended to concentrate around certain values.
or example, if this point of concentration was greater than 0.9, it
ould be indicating a convergence process towards values close to
he frontier. In contrast, a divergence process would be reﬂected in
12 A comparison of means was conducted through the Kruskal-Wallis test, which
as found to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This type of test was chosen
ather than an ANOVA due to the non-normality of the sample, it being truncated
t value 1.
13 Akernel canbe regarded as a smoothedversionof ahistogram. Thebandwidthof
he kernel measures the degree of smoothness employed in estimating the density
unction. The value of the smoothingparameter is determined following Silverman’s
1986) approach.
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a shifting of the probabilistic mass within the distribution range of
the distribution.As shown in Figure 5 for all types of ﬁrms analysed, we can
observe an improvement in efﬁciency due to distributions move to
the frontier (Efﬁciency=1) in selected years (horizontal displace-
ment). If we compare the vertical displacement of the distributions
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rom continually subsidised ﬁrms to ﬁrms non-subsidised, we
an observe the improvement (or closer to the frontier) of the
istributions is intensiﬁed,with non-subsidised ﬁrms the ones that
et the greatest improvement.
Figure 6 shows the density functions of the efﬁciency for the
ears 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002. The results obtained reveal the
hanges that have taken place in the external shape of the dis-
ribution for all the types of subsidy behaviour, changes which
onﬁrm convergence processes towards upper efﬁciency levels.
n this respect, the external shape of the efﬁciency distribution
ppears to be maintained in a single mode, but one that is shifting
ver time.
We should stress that in some subsamples of this classiﬁcation
he number of observations is low, and so the distribution appears
ncomplete in such cases. As was mentioned, examining Figure 6
rom the top to the bottom graph, the distributions can be seen
o shift towards higher values, particularly for the non-subsidised
rms compared to the continually subsidised ﬁrms. Meanwhile,
xamining each graph from left to right, there is a greater spread in
he distributions in the case of the ﬁrms continually receiving sub-
idies (stable ﬁrms), or those that start receiving themand continue
o be subsidised (incoming ﬁrms), compared to the other groups,
articularly the unsubsidised ﬁrms.
In short, whether from the perspective of the mean efﬁciency
alues or applying kernel distributions to observe the whole dis-
ribution, the analyses indicate that the non-subsidised ﬁrms are
ore efﬁcient than the ﬁrms that continually receive subsidies.
ven theﬁrms that stop receivingsubsidiesappear tobehavebetter.
. Conclusions and ﬁnal recommendations
This work provides new evidence about the effects of subsi-
ies for research and development on the technical efﬁciency of
sample of Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms from the ESEE survey
n business strategies during the period 1993-2002. We have esti-
ated the Cobb-Douglas stochastic production frontier following
attese and Coelli’s (1995) model to analyse an unbalanced panel
f innovative ﬁrms, introducing the subsidies received by the ﬁrms
s explanatory variable of their inefﬁciency.
Although subsidies form only a part of the assistance obtained
y Spanish manufacturers (they also receive tax relief, soft loans,
tc.), they are a very important part of such aid. In this respect,
ne of the conclusions of this work relates to the curvilinear rela-
ion between inefﬁciency and subsidies. In other words, as the size
f the subsidy increases, so does the inefﬁciency up to a certain
oint, after which the inefﬁciency begins to decline. Despite this
ehaviour, more than 85% of the sample ﬁrms are in the growth
art of this relation, and 78% are in the part with the steepest slope.
his result suggests two important question, ﬁrstly, the ﬁnding that
rms receiving subsidies are less efﬁcient, this outcome should
erve as guidance to authorities to try to improve the allocation
f these resources in order to avoid this effect, and secondly, less
fﬁcient ﬁrms are those that are unable to obtain resources to fund
&D or get a credit, so that they are the ones who apply for sub-
idies. Taking into account these facts, policymakers should be
xtremely cautious about using subsidies to incentives R&D activi-
ies among Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms, because it is possible that
he subsidies received by them are insufﬁcient or do not arrive
hen they are needed, making difﬁcult to fulﬁll their objectives.
On the other hand, the results of the classiﬁcation of the ﬁrms in
unction of their receipt of subsidies for research and development
continually subsidised, incoming, outgoing, alternating and non-
ubsidised ﬁrms) with respect to the efﬁciency show that during
he period under analysis the non-subsidised ﬁrms are more efﬁ-
ient than the ﬁrms receiving subsidies every year in the period. Inirección de la Empresa 14 (2011) 185–193
addition, a full analysis of the distribution by means of kernel dis-
tributions allows us to conﬁrm the relatively stronger convergence
towards higher efﬁciency levels over time among non-subsidised
ﬁrms.
The analysis of the ﬁrms’ efﬁciency at the sectoral level shows
that themeanefﬁciencyof Spanish industrial ﬁrms ranges from94%
to 99%. This ﬁnding indicates that on average, Spanish ﬁrms could
produce at higher levels. These results are quite different to those of
otherworks using data from the same survey. The differences could
be due to although the current study uses a Cobb-Douglas model,
like Martín and Suárez (2000), Gumbau (1998), and Gumbau and
Maudos (2002), it applies an estimation model in one single stage,
introducing the variable subsidies as determinant of the efﬁciency.
Nevertheless, the efﬁciency measure refers to a judgment about
the relation between the resources used (inputs) and a measure of
the results obtained (output), so that the idea of opportunity costs
underlies both concepts (Bosch et al., 1998).
The absence of other work in this line of research relating efﬁ-
ciency and subsidies, at the national or international levels, has
prevented us from comparing the results obtained here in this
speciﬁc context. Possible extensions of this work could focus on
comparing the results obtained here with those of ﬁrms from
other countries. The ﬁndings of this work could also suggest some
interesting reﬂections, for example: it appears to be inefﬁcient to
continue subsidising Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms as is being done
at present. This may have something to do with the size of the sub-
sidies, the time it takes for the subsidies to reach the ﬁrms, or the
process of selecting which ﬁrms to subsidise. In this respect, larger
ﬁrms probably obtain subsidies for projects that they could have
undertaken without such assistance, while smaller ﬁrms may not
be obtaining subsidies, making it impossible for them to undertake
larger-scale projects.
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